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INTRODUCTION
In 1956, the multinational corporation Shell discovered oil near the Nigeri-
an village of Oloibiri.1 This unearthing led to decades of lucrative extractions 
that earned billions for the global conglomerate.2 The extraction of oil came at 
an immense cost to the surrounding communities. In addition to the cata-
strophic environmental impact that Shell’s operations had on villages within 
close proximity,3 Shell also worked with the Nigerian government to sustain its 
operations and suppress community protests.4 The infamous Ogoni massacre 
took place in the 1990s. Shell financed Nigerian military operations to over-
whelm community opposition against the company.5 Peaceful protestors were 
shot, beaten, threatened, and raped with the underlying aim of sustaining Shell’s 
presence and operations in the Ogoni region.6 Shell’s actions eventually came 
to light. Litigation based on Shell’s brash violations of human rights began in 
the United States in 1996 and continued for thirteen years before the parties 
reached a settlement of $15.5 million.7 The settlement has been commended as 
a “milestone moment in the movement towards accountability and human 
rights.”8
Even two decades ago, the adjudication of claims at the nexus of business 
and human rights like those of Shell and the Ogoni people would be unusual in 
any setting besides a traditional courtroom. But within the past five years alone, 
the idea of arbitral tribunals hearing claims of human rights abuses related to 
business operations has gained enormous momentum.9 This culminated in 2019 
with the introduction of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbi-
tration (the “Hague Rules”). The Hague Rules were developed with an eye to 
the “peculiarities of disputes concerning human rights violation perpetuated by 
businesses.”10 They are toted as offering a “new and innovative” option for re-
solving disputes related to corporate responsibility and as a mechanism to im-
plement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.11
1. Amnesty Int’l, On Trial: Shell in Nigeria, AI INDEX AFR 44/1698/2020 (Jan. 2020). 
2. Id.
3. Id.







9. See generally, Maria Laura Izzo, A Further Step Towards Business and Human Rights 




11. Lee M. Caplan, Timothy J. Feighery & Jason Rotstein, New Arbitration Rules for the 
Resolution of Business and Human Rights Disputes Unveiled, ARENT FOX (Feb. 7, 2020), 
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This paper critically assesses the Hague Rules’ stance on third-party join-
der. Third-party joinder is an important feature in business human rights dis-
putes. It is a mechanism that victims of human rights abuses can use to bring 
claims against corporate defendants where the victims do not otherwise have an 
underlying agreement on which to base their claim. Keeping in line with tradi-
tional conceptions of commercial arbitration, the Hague Rules are grounded in 
party consent to arbitrate.12 Conceptions of consent therefore have an outsized 
impact on the universe of parties who can bring actions against corporations be-
fore arbitral tribunals for human rights abuses. The main objective of this paper 
is to offer an alternative framework of third-party joinder and consent to 
achieve a better balance between the interests of claimants alleging human 
rights abuses and corporate defendants.
Part I traces the rise of arbitral tribunals as fora for business human rights 
disputes. Part II outlines the procedural shortcomings of third-party joinder in 
business human rights cases before arbitral tribunals under the Hague Rules.
Part III advocates for a new framework to guide arbitral tribunals when as-
sessing whether to allow requests for third-party joinder.
I. THE RISE OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS AS FORA FOR BUSINESS HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISPUTES
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”) 
were the first major global standard addressing the intersection and impact of 
global business practices and human rights.13 The Hague Rules are a set of 
complementary principles that help effect the UNGPs within commercial arbi-
tration. Section I.A details the history of the UNGPs; Section I.B explores the 
rise of arbitral tribunals as recognized fora for human rights disputes and 
weighs their benefits and shortcomings.
A. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
The UNGPs were drafted in 2011 by UN Special Representative to the Sec-
retary General on business and human rights, John Ruggie.14 In their original 
form, the UNGPs were envisioned as a building block for a new international 
https://www.arentfox.com/perspectives/international-arbitration-dispute-resolution-blog/new-
arbitration-rules-the-resolution.
12. Michiel Coenraads, Sarah Ellington, Tamara Preuss & Ben Sanderson, Update: The 
Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=12d34707-04ed-4d49-a913-bf71476e356f.
13. See U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, OHCHR and Business and Human 
Rights (2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/BusinessIndex.aspx.
14. John Gerard Ruggie, The Paradox of Corporate Globalization: Disembedding and 
Reembedding Governing Norms 22, (Harvard Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG Working Paper Series No. 
2020-01, 2020); Background & History of the Guiding Principles, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESOURCE CTR. (2021), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/big-issues/un-guiding-principles-
on-business-human-rights/background-history-of-guiding-principles/.
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treaty which would create binding human rights obligations for states and cor-
porations alike,15 “regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership, and 
structure.”16 The treaty never came to fruition. Instead, at the urging of Ruggie, 
the UN Human Rights Council (“HRC”) unanimously endorsed the 31 UNGPs 
in 2011.17 The HRC’s endorsement was pivotal. In Ruggie’s words, this stamp 
of approval “elevated the UNGPs beyond pure voluntarism, into the domain of 
‘soft law.’”18
“Multiperspectival framing” informed the drafting of the UNGPs.19 The 
drafters viewed transnational corporate conduct as shaped by public, civil, and 
corporate governance. The thirty-one principles together act as a conduit to uni-
fy these different systems of governance on the matter of business and human 
rights.20 Three pillars—”Protect, Respect, and Remedy”—form the backbone 
of the UNGP framework.21 The distinct responsibilities of state and corporate 
actors under each pillar in turn work to enforce the overarching goals of the 
UNGPs.22
Although the UNGPs do not themselves create a cause of action,23 they 
have been used as evidence by claimants to support alleged breaches of state 
and corporate duties. Take, for example, the case of Araya v. Nevsun Re-
sources, Ltd. Here, the Supreme Court of British Columbia weighed evidence 
from Lloyd Lipsett, an expert in human rights assessments,24 who invoked the 
defendant corporation’s human rights due diligence obligations under the 
UNGPs.25 The court permitted the case to proceed on the grounds that claimant 
had alleged a bona fide claim of jus cogens violations which was in turn a viola-
tion of Canadian national law.26
Claimants also rely upon the UNGPs in commercial arbitration.27 Examples 
of instances in which the UNGPs are appealed to within private commercial ar-
15. Id. 
16. Special Rep. of the Sec’y- Gen., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Im-
plementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC
/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UN Guiding Principles].




21. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 3. 
22. Ruggie, supra note 14, at 23.
23. See Laurie E. Abbott, Integrating the Ruggie Guiding Principles into the International 
Economic Community, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 261, 263 (2013). 
24. Malcolm Rogge, Nevsun puts Canada’s Corporate Decision Makers in the Human 
Rights Zone 3 (Corp. Responsibility Initiative, Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 70, 
2020). 
25. Araya v. Nevsun Resources, Ltd., [2016] BCSC 1856 para. 64 (Can. B. C. Sup. Ct.). 
26. See id; see also John F. Sherman III, Beyond CSR: The Story of the UN Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights 26 (Corp. Resp. Initiative, Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working 
Paper No. 71, 2020).
27. See Sherman, supra note 26, at 34.
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bitration are hard to come by due to the confidential nature of arbitral proceed-
ings.28 But if the more public fora of bilateral investment treaty arbitration tri-
bunals are indicative of deliberations within the private commercial setting, the 
UNGPs are influential. One well-known example is that of Urbaser v. Argenti-
na, a dispute in which a private corporation supplying water and sewage ser-
vices sued Argentina after the country’s implementation of emergency measures 
allegedly contributed to the company’s insolvency.29 Argentina filed a counter-
claim, asserting that the company’s failures to provide the requisite level of in-
vestment in water and sewage services violated Argentinians’ human right to 
water.30 Argentina’s counterclaim was struck down on the facts.31 However, 
by way of reference to the UNGPs, the tribunal noted that “it can no longer be 
admitted [that] the companies operating internationally are immune from be-
coming subjects of international law.”32 It further acknowledged that corporate 
social responsibility in international commerce included commitments to com-
ply with human rights obligations wherever the company had operations.33
A second example shows arbitrators in the ICSID tribunal relying on the 
UNGPs in their reasoning within the case of Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. 
Republic of Perú. Here, a Canadian mining company attempted to invest in the 
development of a mine on Peruvian territory.34 Local communities opposed the 
development of the mine through violent protests; when a new government was 
elected in 2011, it shuttered the mining project in an effort to quell the unrest.35
The Canadian company sued for expropriation of its investment and Peru initi-
ated a counterclaim under the bilateral investment treaty.36 In its deliberations, 
the tribunal used the UNGPs to support the contention that “international law 
accepts corporate responsibility as a standard of crucial importance for compa-
nies operating in the field of international commerce.”37 The tribunal further 
noted that companies operating internationally were no longer immune from 
becoming subjects of international law.38
Reliance on the UNGPs by tribunals and claimants alike is indicative of the 
trend towards using arbitral tribunals as fora for business human rights disputes.
28. See id at 35.
29. Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award ¶¶ 34-38 
(Dec. 8, 2016).
30. Id., ¶ 36.
31. Id., ¶ 1234.
32. Id., ¶ 1195. 
33. Id.
34. Stefanie Shacherer, Bear Creek v. Peru, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV: KEY CASES 
FROM THE 2010S 4. (Oct. 2018); Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/14/21 (Nov. 30, 2019).
35. Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, ¶¶ 
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Whether these tribunals are adequate sites for the resolution of such disputes, 
however, is a question that has generated animated discussion from commenta-
tors on both sides.
B. Arbitral Tribunals as Fora for Human Rights Disputes
The potential of arbitral tribunals to serve as effective fora for human rights 
claims is often debated.39 Let us begin with the benefits: the nature of transna-
tional business makes arbitral tribunals a natural site of dispute resolution be-
tween parties. First, they are quick.40 Even when capable domestic courts are 
available, arbitral tribunals have the advantage of nimbler adjudicative process-
es that yield speedier resolutions.41 Second, the decisions are enforceable 
worldwide. The New York Convention gives full effect to arbitration awards 
by obliging its parties to “ensure such awards are recognized and generally ca-
pable of enforcement in their jurisdiction in the same way as domestic 
awards.”42 Third, it is increasingly customary for contracting parties to consent 
to arbitration ex ante in disputes over transnational corporate contracts.43 Final-
ly, the omnipresence of commercial arbitration makes the arbitral forum ripe for 
addressing the intersection of business and human rights.
Not all agree that the benefits of business human rights arbitration outweigh 
its shortcomings. The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment is a vocal 
critic of using arbitral tribunals as a forum to hear business human rights 
claims.44 The perceived deficiency that most concerns the Columbia Center is 
the access-to-remedy problem implicit within business human rights arbitra-
tion.45 The access-to-remedy problem implies two distinct issues: first, arbitra-
tion may hinder rather than advance justice in business human rights cases; sec-
ond, when arbitration does provide for a remedy, the paths to relief are 
39. See Diane Desierto, Why Arbitrate Business and Human Rights Disputes? Public Con-
sultation Period Open for the Draft Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration,
EJIL:TALK! (July 12, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/public-consultation-period-until-august-25-
for-the-draft-hague-rules-on-business-and-human-rights-arbitration/.
40. See Claes Cronstedt, Jain Eijsbouts, Adrienne Margolis, Martijn Scheltema, Robert C. 
Thompson, & Steven Ratner, International Arbitration of Human Rights: A Step Forward, KLUWER 
ARB. BLOG (Nov. 16, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/11/16/international-
arbitration-business-human-rights-step-forward/.
41. See E. Norman Veasey, The Conundrum of the Arbitration vs. Litigation Decision,
A.B.A. (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2015
/12/07_veasey/.
42. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
43. Leila Anglade, The Use of Transnational Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 38 
THE IRISH JURIST 92, 92 (2003).
44. Business and Human Rights Arbitration, COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (Feb. 
21, 2019), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/02/21/business-and-human-rights-arbitration/.
45. See Lisa Sachs, Lise Johnson, Kaitlin Cordes, Jesse Coleman, & Brooke Guven, The 
Business and Human Rights Arbitration Rule Project: Falling Short of its Access to Justice Objec-
tives, COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. 1 (Sept. 2019).
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impermissibly narrow.46 The Columbia Center also expresses concern that the 
claims of victims of human rights abuses rely on company consent to arbitration 
and that consent will only be given when there are advantages for the corporate 
defendant.47 This in turn implies that consent to defend against a claim in the 
arbitral forum will only be given when doing so when would preclude ad-
vantages for the plaintiff bringing the claim.48
For business human rights arbitration to succeed, the Columbia Center’s 
concerns must be addressed in full. Business human rights arbitration is a bur-
geoning field and there is still time to mold the norms surrounding its use. But 
that window of opportunity is closing. Business human rights arbitration will 
suffer from a legitimacy crisis if critics continue to view the arbitral tribunal as 
a playing field tilted in favor of corporate interests.49 One major initiative to 
correct this perception is the 2019 Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights.
However, the Hague Rules have not themselves been immune to criticism.
The following sections limit their discussion to the Hague Rules’ proce-
dures on third-party joinder. Part II addresses the shortcomings of the Hague 
Rules in this realm and proposes a framework for how the recommended proce-
dures on joinder might be adapted to better address concerns surrounding busi-
ness human rights arbitration such as those voiced by the Columbia Center.
III. THE PROCEDURAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THIRD-PARTY JOINDER IN THE 
HAGUE RULES
In 2019, the Business and Human Rights Arbitration Working Group (the 
“Drafters”) introduced the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitra-
tion.50 The Hague Rules are a proposed set of non-binding rules for the arbitra-
tion of business and human rights disputes.51 The creation of the Hague Rules 
themselves is an acknowledgment of the burgeoning use of arbitral tribunals as 
a forum to bring claims of human rights violations.
The Hague Rules are comprehensive. They address a wide range of mat-
ters, from the preliminary procedural aspects of arbitration, to the nuances of a 
hearing’s transparency, to the award and other costs of arbitration.52 The Draft-
ers envisioned the Hague Rules as applicable to a range of parties beyond those 
suing under a contract.53 The term “business and human rights” is not explicitly 
46. See id. at 1–2. 
47. See id. at 3. 
48. See id.
49. See id. at 6. 
50. See generally THE HAGUE RULES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARBITRATION, CTR
FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION (Dec. 2019), https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/12
/The-Hague-Rules-on-Business-and-Human-Rights-Arbitration_CILC-digital-version.pdf [hereinaf-
ter The Hague Rules].
51. Id. at 1. 
52. See generally id.
53. Id. at 3. 
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defined within the Hague Rules beyond the understanding that the term is “un-
derstood at least as broadly as the meaning such terms have under the 
[UNGPs].”54 The stated purpose of the Hague Rules includes contributing to 
the judicial remedy gap in the UNGPs.55
Article 19 of the Hague Rules governs third-party joinder and multi-party 
claims.56 In their current iteration, the Rules allow “one or more third persons 
to join in the arbitration as a party provided such person is a party to or a third-
party beneficiary of the underlying legal instrument.”57 Third-party joinder is 
an essential component of business human rights disputes. Because victims of 
human rights abuses are not party to an underlying contract, third-party joinder 
is one way to push through a claim that one would not otherwise be permitted to 
bring before an arbitral tribunal. This paper contends that the Hague Rules 
governing third-party joinder are based on too narrow a conception of consent 
and accord too much deference to individual tribunals to be effective.
A. The Hague Rules on Third-Party Joinder: Explicit Consent and Deference 
to Individual Tribunals
1.  The Use of Explicit Consent
One of the most salient features of the Hague Rules is their adherence to the 
understanding of arbitration as a consent-based process.58 Through model 
clauses, commentary, and the rules themselves, the provisions encourage actors 
to be explicit about to whom each party grants arbitration rights.59 The Hague 
Rules further contemplate (but do not require) consent to third-party claims.60
In their preliminary deliberations, the Drafters considered three possible 
forms of consent-based models: ex ante contracts; ex post submission agree-
ments; and multilateral independent agreements, such as the rights to arbitrate 
created under the Bangladesh Accords.61 The Drafters acknowledged in partic-
ular the difficulties that would arise with the inclusion of third-party beneficiary 
54. Id.
55. See Launch of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration, CTR FOR 
INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION , https://www.cilc.nl/project/the-hague-rules-on-business-and-human-
rights-arbitration/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
56. The Hague Rules, supra note 50, at 39.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3 (“As with all arbitration, proper and informed consent remains the cornerstone of 
business and human rights arbitration.”).
59. Id. at 105–06. 
60. Id. at 106. 
61. Ctr for Int’l Legal Cooperation, International Arbitration of Business and Human Rights 
Disputes: Elements for Consideration in Draft Arbitral Rules, Model Clauses, and Other Aspects of 
the Arbitral Process, at 5 (2018), https://www.cilc.nl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Elements-
Paper_INTERNATIONAL-ARBITRATION-OF-BUSINESS-AND-HUMAN-RIGHTS-DISPUTE.
font12.pdf.
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principles, noting that “it would be unlikely for a company to offer open con-
sent to an unidentified group of persons, particularly without privity.”62
In their final iteration, the Hague Rules address the possibility of multiparty 
claims and the possibility of joinder, allowing for one or more third parties to 
join an existing arbitration.63 The Hague Rules provide two mechanisms for 
joinder. First, third-party claims may be permitted when the underlying legal 
instrument in which the arbitration clause is contained grants a right to certain 
third parties who are “recognized as having an interest in the enforcement of 
such rights through arbitral proceedings.”64 Second, the arbitration agreement 
itself could grant those same third parties the right to join arbitral proceedings.65
Commentary to the relevant article notes that this provision newly “sets aside 
the presumption in certain jurisdictions whereby an agreement to arbitrate is 
construed as a waiver of the right to proceed with class, mass, collective, or 
multi-party action in any forum, including in an arbitration brought under that 
very arbitration agreement.”66 However, the requirements for joinder under the 
Hague Rules are vague and largely left to the discretion of individual tribu-
nals—“[t]he question of whether class, mass, collective, or multi-party proce-
dures are available and appropriate for the particular arbitration is . . . left to be 
determined by the arbitral tribunal taking into account the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case.”67
2.  Deference to Individual Tribunals
Because the Hague Rules delegate authority of third-party joinder to indi-
vidual commercial tribunals, briefly examining the practices of these arbitration 
tribunals is worthwhile. One of the most common standards for third-party 
joinder used by tribunals is the so-called prima facie test.68 In this instance, 
third-party joinder is permitted if the tribunal decides that “at first sight, on the 
first appearance, or on the face” that an arbitration agreement may exist be-
tween parties to a commercial agreement.69 Non-signatories to an arbitration 
62. Katerina Yiannibas, The effectiveness of international arbitration to provide remedy for 
business-related human rights abuses, ACCOUNTABILITY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS,
AND THE LAW (eds. Liesbeth Enneking, Ivo Giesen, Anne-Jetske Schaap, Cedric Ryngaert, François 
Kristen, & Lucas Roorda, 2019). 
63. The Hague Rules , supra note 50, at 39. 
64. See id. at 39; see also id. at 41. 
65. Id.
66. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
67. Id.
68. Dongdoo Choi, Joinder in International Commercial Arbitration, 35 ARB. INT’L 29, 34–
35 (2019) (discussing how the prima facie test is used by the ICC, SIAC, HKIAC, and CIETAC 
among others). 
69. Id. at 35. 
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agreement might prevail on this theory on the argument that the facts of the case 
justify an extension of the contract to the parties in question.70
Other tribunals are more flexible. For example, the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration (“LCIA”) allows for joinder of any third party upon appli-
cation to the tribunal.71 Under LCIA Rules, the tribunal interprets the contract-
ing parties as having delegated power to the tribunal to add other parties to the 
matter before the tribunal, even without the consent of all parties concerned.72
The Swiss Rules of International Arbitration leave it to the tribunal to decide 
whether a third-party joinder should be permitted “after consulting with all of 
the parties” and “taking into account all relevant circumstances.”73 In a similar 
vein, the Netherlands Arbitration Institute conditions third-party participation 
upon having an interest in the outcome of the arbitral proceedings.74
B. The Requirement of Explicit Consent Undermines the Legitimacy of 
Business Human Rights Arbitration
1.  Explicit Consent Limits Viable Business Human Rights Cases within 
Arbitral Tribunals
The formulation of third-party joinder set forth within the Hague Rules does 
not equip arbitral tribunals with the tools to fulfill the third foundational pillar 
of the UNGPs: the right to an effective remedy.75 At bottom, the problem is 
one of victim access to a procedural remedy. The Hague Rules are founded up-
on the principle of consent.76 Although the rules themselves do not comprehen-
sively address the parties’ “modalities” of consent,77 they indicate that tradi-
tional, explicit agreements are optimal, such as ex ante contractual clauses or ex 
post submission agreements.78 The Hague Rules further caution against tribu-
nals relying on “unwarranted presumptions of knowledge and consent” for non-
contractual claims in particular.79
70. Id.
71. THE LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARB., LCIA ARBITRATION RULES Art. 22.1(viii) (Oct. 1, 
2014), https://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx.
72. Hilary Heilbron, Arbitration: Of joinder and jurisdiction, INT’L COMP. LEGAL 
GUIDES (Feb. 15, 2016), https://iclg.com/cdr/arbitration-and-adr/6162-arbitration-of-joinder-and-
jurisdiction.
73. SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARB. INST., SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (SWISS 
RULES) Art. 4(2) (June 2012), https://www.swissarbitration.org/files/837/Swiss%20Rules%202019
/Web%20versions%202019/Arbitration%20Web%202019/Arbitration
/SwissRules2012_English_2019.pdf.
74. NETHERLANDS ARB. INST., ARBITRATION RULES art. 37(1) (Jan. 1, 2015).
75. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 22.
76. The Hague Rules, supra note 50, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 19.
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This approach permits only a small number of business human rights cases 
to reach the floor of the tribunal. The Hague Rules formulation hinges on one of 
two scenarios. In the first, an alleged violator of human rights could open itself 
up to litigation after the violative acts have already been committed; this is a 
course of action that no known party has taken to date. Alternatively, corpora-
tions could contract ahead of time to permit such proceedings. One frequently 
cited success story is that of the Bangladesh Accord, an agreement created in 
the aftermath of the Rana Plaza tragedy that binds its multinational corporation 
signatories to arbitration for human rights disputes.80 Setting aside the charges 
of whitewashing and imposition of buyer-controlled liability,81 one might offer 
a further critique of the Accord: its unicorn status. Even taking the positive ac-
counts of the Accord’s effects at face value,82 the benefits of the agreement are 
confined to the garment industry in Bangladesh. This is an incremental subset 
of the universe of business and human rights cases that might otherwise arise.
Conditioning a remedy to human rights abuses upon the alleged violators’ ex-
plicit consent is not a viable solution for the majority of potential cases, even if 
explicit party consent is the status quo. In this way, the Hague Rules pay ample 
attention to the UNGP’s “culturally appropriate” mandate and not nearly 
enough to the direction that the arbitral processes are “rights compatible.”83
2.  Explicit Consent Violates the Principle of the Equality of Aims
The requirement of an explicit consent to arbitrate third-party claims of hu-
man rights abuses violates the principle of the equality of aims, a maxim by 
which most arbitral tribunals abide.84 Scholars have argued that when a third 
party can lose claims if barred from an arbitral proceeding, joinder should be 
permitted—even if not all parties consent—as long as all rules of participation 
are kept equal for all parties.85 This is a salient point in many instances of hu-
80. ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH (May 13, 2013), 
https://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/the_accord.pdf [hereinafter Bangladesh Accord]; 
see also Suleyman Wellings-Longmore, Business and Human Rights Arbitration: Widening the net 
of remedies, LINKLATERS (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.linklaters.com/en-us/insights/blogs
/arbitrationlinks/2019/september/business-and-human-rights-arbitration-widening-the-net-of-
remedies.
81. See, e.g., Jaakko Salminen, The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh: A 
New Paradigm for Limiting Buyers’ Liability in Global Supply Chains?, 66 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 411
(2018).
82. See, e.g., Beryl ter Haar & Maarten Keune, One Step Forward of More Window-
Dressing? A Legal Analysis of Recent CSR Initiatives in the Garment Industry in Bangladesh, 30 
INT’L J. COMPAR. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 5, 24 (2014); Steven Greenhouse & Jim Yardley, Global
Retailers Join Safety Plan for Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com
/2013/05/14/world/asia/bangladeshs-cabinet-approves-changes-to-labor-laws.html.
83. See UN Guiding Principles , supra note 16, at 24, 25. 
84. S.I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An In-
fringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 915, 979 (1998). 
85. E.g., id. at 980. 
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man rights abuses. Often, allegations of human rights violations occur in areas 
where “national courts are dysfunctional, corrupt, politically influenced and/or 
simply unqualified.”86 Moreover, even when the available national courts are 
fully functional, claimants’ victories can dangle on the domestic system’s recep-
tivity to transnational tort claims.87 The possibility of dysfunctional systems 
and restrictions on national courts’ openness to transnational claims also under-
pin the reason that contracting themselves parties opt for arbitration. Finally, 
the equality of aims principle is recognized within the UNGP articles them-
selves: grievance mechanisms must be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equi-
table, transparent, and rights-compatible.88 If an international tribunal is the on-
ly viable avenue to obtain redress for victims of human rights violations, it 
violates the principle of equality of aims along with the UNGPs in refusing to 
consider the claims. Properly considered, the principle of equality of aims per-
mits third-party joinder for victims of human rights abuses that did not have the 
occasion to sign on to an arbitral agreement but who were nevertheless affected 
by its outcome.
There is, however, a limiting principle that one must contend with when ap-
plying the equality of aims argument. This comes to light when theory meets 
practice. The complete vindication of the equality of aims may not be realized 
in an arbitral setting without losing corporate buy-in for the project of business 
human rights arbitration altogether. Corporations must have an incentive to ar-
bitrate.89 Effective procedures governing business human rights claims must 
not tilt the scale so far towards plaintiff interests that corporate entities lose the 
incentive to arbitrate altogether. If companies perceive arbitration as a forum 
for open-ended liability, this could have a chilling effect on business human 
rights arbitration as a whole.90 In sum, the Hague Rules can go further in rec-
ognizing and upholding the principle of the equality of aims. However, to be 
effective, any newly proposed framework must take into account these limiting 
principles that arise from practice.
3.  Counterarguments: Consent As the Cornerstone of Arbitration
Critics may contend that the principle of equality cannot overcome the cor-
nerstone of international arbitration—”[a]rbitration is always based on a consent 
agreement between the parties.”91 However, this statement is better viewed as a 
platitude grounded in legal fiction rather than a solid foundation of transnational 
86. The Launch of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration, supra note 
55.
87. Desierto, supra note 39.
88. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 33–34. 
89. Sachs et al., supra note 45, at 2–3. 
90. See Isabelle Glimcher, Arbitration of Human and Labor Rights: The Bangladesh Experi-
ence, 52 N.Y. J. INT’L L. & POL. 231, 259 (2019).
91. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.: INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., COURSE 
ON DISP. SETTLEMENT 1 (2003).
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arbitration. Interpretations that stretch the traditional bounds of “consent” are 
increasingly common in arbitration.92 From alter-ego workarounds for corpora-
tions93 to waivers of consent derived from principles of equitable estoppel,94
inroads to the “nondiscretionary” precondition of explicit consent are frequent. 
It is unreasonable to adhere to a strict construction of a consent agreement with-
in the Hague Rules and particularly so when violations of human rights are on 
the table.
Moreover, one cannot contemplate such arguments in a vacuum. Despite 
corporations at times holding more economic power than the countries in which 
they invest, multinational corporations (MNCs) have historically evaded legal 
human rights obligations.95 At times, this evasion of responsibility is precisely 
because of their economic power.96 This power imbalance between plaintiffs 
and corporate defendants not only arises in cases involving MNCs, but also in 
corporate defendants whose structure does not reach the level of breadth and 
power of MNCs. These defendants are nevertheless often in an exceptionally 
more powerful position in terms of resources and legal capabilities than plain-
tiffs bringing claims of human rights abuses.97 Corporations’ legal responsibili-
ties are remarkably limited: even under the UNGPs, an instrument lauded as 
ground-breaking in the field of business and human rights,98 corporations are 
not bound by legal obligations per se. Corporate entities have recurrently taken 
advantage of this accountability loophole by violating individuals’ human rights 
with impunity.99
With these considerations in mind, international tribunals are both an ap-
propriate and necessary forum to balance the interest of holding human rights 
abusers accountable against the interests of corporations. Put simply, tribunals 
should take into account the principle of equity— along with the mainstay prin-
ciple of equality—vis-à-vis the admission of human rights claims in arbitral tri-
bunals. This is not to suggest that tribunals give claimants carte blanche to 
bring any number of tangentially-related allegations when a multinational cor-
92. See Benson Lim & Adriana Uson, Relooking at Consent in Arbitration, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Feb. 12, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/02/12/relooking-at-
consent-in-arbitration/.
93. See Michael H. Bagot, Jr. & Dana A. Henderson, Not Party, Not Bound? Not Necessari-
ly: Binding Third Parties to Maritime Arbitration, 26 TUL. MAR. L.J. 413, 447 (2002).
94. See generally id. at 438–47.
95. Maciej {enkiewicz, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and UN 
Initiatives, 12 REV. INT’L L. & POL. 121, 123–26 (2016).
96. Id. at 125.
97. Sachs et al., supra note 45, at 1. 
98. See John Gerard Ruggie, The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights 1 (Harvard Kennedy Fac. Rsch. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
RWP17-030, 2017).
99. See generally Davide Fiaschi, Elisa Guiliani, Chiara Macchi, Michelangelo Murano, & 
Oriana Perrone, To Abuse or Not to Abuse. This Is the Question., (Lab. of Econ. & Mgmt. Working 
Paper Series, 2011), https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/abb74e1af66bd041b
33926cc93cdb527e0042a24.pdf.
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poration is concerned; as discussed in Section III.B, a number of limiting prin-
ciples must be imposed on any theory of corporate accountability. But it should 
inform how tribunals and the Hague Rules themselves weigh the admissibility 
of human rights violations, particularly when no other viable forum exists in 
which to bring the claim.
C. Outsized Deference to Individual Tribunals’ Rules Undermines the 
Legitimacy of Business Human Rights Arbitration
The second shortcoming of the Hague Rules with respect to third-party 
joinder in instances of human rights abuses is the flexibility and deference ac-
corded to the tribunals themselves. Major arbitral tribunals have yet to adopt a 
uniform approach to the admission of third-party claims.100 Outcomes that vary 
based on mere geographic convenience proliferate: why should victims of hu-
man rights abuses in South Asia receive different treatment simply because their 
abusers more often opt for arbitration in the SIAC,101 whereas victims in the 
Netherlands reap the benefit of the more third-party-friendly NAI rules?102 This 
issue is not limited to claims in front of arbitration tribunals; parties bringing 
actions in regional human rights courts face the same disparate treatment. The 
claims of victims of human rights abuses should not depend upon the per-
chance rules of a pre-designated forum. Just as the Hague Rules have success-
fully formalized previously incongruent arbitral rules, so should they formalize 
the rules of third-party joinder to allegations of human rights violations within 
their policies.
The second problem with this construction of third-party joinder looks past 
principles of predictability to the substantive rules of tribunals themselves and 
the way such rules are enacted. The Hague Rules are unique in that they are 
readily adaptable and take into account the specific challenges of arbitrating 
business and human rights disputes. In contrast to the precise aims of the Hague 
Rules, the individual rules of arbitral tribunals governing third-party joinder in 
all cases are a blunt instrument to remedy practices surrounding third-party 
joinder in human rights disputes. Such rules rarely diverge based on subject-
matter,103 and it may not be practicable to lower the bar for consent to third-
party joinder for claims outside of the scope of human rights abuses.
Moreover, tribunals’ requirements regarding third-party joinder are difficult 
to overcome for claimants alleging human rights violations. Recall that one of 
the most common analyses used across tribunals to test the validity of an appli-
cation for third-party joinder is that of the prima facie test.104 Such a rule, while 
100. See supra Section II.A.
101. See Singapore Int’l Arb. Ctr., Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitra-
tion Centre, 6th ed. (Aug. 1, 2016, https://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-rules-2016.
102. See NETHERLANDS ARB. INST., supra note 74, art. 37(1).
103. See, e.g., NETHERLANDS ARB. INST., supra note 74.
104. See supra Section II.A. 
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perhaps a sound practice in strict instances of commercial arbitration, is a boon 
for corporate defendants evading accountability for human rights violations.
Except in rare instances—such as when an ex post submission agreement is al-
ready in place105—MNCs need only prove that no prima facie agreement to ar-
bitrate exists.106 If a plaintiff’s petition for joinder is rejected, all avenues for 
remedy are not closed off. Tribunal rules such as those of the International 
Chamber of Commerce permit plaintiffs to take their claims to domestic courts 
with appropriate jurisdictional powers.107 However, if the tortious incident took 
place in an emerging economy with suboptimal judicial infrastructure, this final 
option will be of little comfort to plaintiffs.
III. THIRD-PARTY JOINDER AND THE HAGUE RULES: A NEW PROPOSAL
A. Required Characteristics of a Successful Mechanism
A successful set of rules governing third-party joinder would remedy the 
deficiencies implicit within the Hague Rules on multiparty claims.108 A new, 
successful framework should ensure two results. First, the new rules should 
cause arbitral tribunals to hear a higher proportion of the existing, viable busi-
ness human rights claims. This, in turn, will help fulfil the third foundational 
UNGP pillar of victims’ right to an effective remedy.109 Second, the new rules 
should take into account the equality of aims principle and permit third-party 
joinder of human rights claims when appropriate, even when the corporate de-
fendant does not give explicit consent to a third-party’s claim. Each of these 
developments will improve the legitimacy of business human rights arbitration 
as a whole.
New rules controlling third-party joinder should also mimic the Hague 
Rules Drafters’ intent of carefully balancing parties’ legitimate interests.110
Competing stakeholders include companies, civil society, and the tribunals 
themselves. Buy-in from companies requires preserving the limiting principle 
of party consent to arbitrate (although not to the degree outlined by the current 
iteration of the Hague Rules).111 Civil society actors will be less inclined to en-
dorse a mechanism perceived as toothless. Therefore, the new rules must in-
105. See supra Section II.B. 
106. Choi, supra note 68, at 35.
107. William Park, Challenging Arbitral Jurisdiction: The Role of Institutional Rules 7 (Bos-
ton Univ. L. Sch., Public L. & Legal Theory Paper No. 15-40, 2015). 
108. See supra Section II.B.
109. See UN Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 27.
110. See The Hague Rules, supra note 50, art. 1 cmt. 1.
111. See Benson Lim & Adriana Uson, Relooking at Consent in Arbitration, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Feb. 12, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/02/12/relooking-at-
consent-in-arbitration/ (“[M]arginalising consent . . . is inimical to the development of arbitration 
because it detracts from the fundamentals which made arbitration popular to commercial parties in 
the first place.”).
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clude concrete changes that improve the ability of victims of human rights 
abuses to bring claims against companies in the arbitral tribunal setting. Per-
haps most crucial, tribunals themselves must be willing to apply such rules.
The proposed procedures should not stray from the principles at the heart of ar-
bitral tribunal procedures. They must be sufficiently neutral, fair, flexible, effi-
cient, and capable of being tailored to the needs of disparate disputes.112
The new set of rules must also meet the “effectiveness criteria for non-
judicial grievance mechanisms” contained within the UNGPs.113 These criteria 
include legitimacy, transparency, predictability, and accessibility.114 To effect 
these goals, the new rules on third-party joinder should be contained within the 
Hague Rules themselves. The process by which the Hague Rules were devel-
oped included multiple rounds of transparent deliberation and consultation with 
relevant stakeholders.115 This points to the possibility of similar consultation 
and revision to the rules in the future. Moreover, should arbitral tribunals en-
dorse and abide by the Hague Rules, housing the new joinder policies within 
this framework will ensure legitimacy, transparency, and accessibility to the 
grievance mechanisms for relevant stakeholders.
Substantively, the current iteration of the Hague Rules on third-party join-
der falls short on predictability. The flexibility and deference accorded to indi-
vidual tribunals allows for vastly different results depending on the tribunal 
hearing the claim. The possibility of different results which vary based on the 
tribunal hearing the matter is an appealing feature of parties’ freedom to con-
tract in commercial disputes. When applied to human rights claims however, 
these same features are inimical.116 Thus, effective rules governing third-party 
joinder should direct tribunals to apply the Hague Rules in eligible claims as-
serting human rights abuses, regardless of the individual tribunal’s chosen pro-
cedure that might otherwise govern in commercial settings.
B. The Proposed Framework
This Section proposes a framework that arbitral tribunals should adopt 
when, while presiding over a business dispute, a request is made for third-party 
joinder alleging human rights abuses. The recommended mechanism is intend-
112. See Gary Born, Principle of Judicial Non-Interference in International Arbitral Proceed-
ings, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 999, 1001–03 (2009). 
113. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 26 (Principle 31).
114. Id.
115. Abhisar Viyarthi, Hague Rules on Business Human Rights Arbitration: What Lies 
Ahead, AMER. REV. INT’L ARB. (Sept. 28, 2020). See also Summary Paper on Sounding Board 
Consultation Round 1, CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION (June 2019), https://www.cilc.nl/cms
/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Summary-Paper-Sounding-Board-Consultation-Round-1-%E2%80%
93-Results.pdf; Public Consultation on Business and Human Rights Arbitration, CTR. FOR INT’L
LEGAL COOP. (June 2019), https://www.cilc.nl/worldwide-public-consultation-on-the-hague-rules-
on-business-and-human-rights-arbitration/.
116. See supra Section II.C. 
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ed to replace Article 19 of the Hague Rules governing multiparty claims.117
The framework includes three key provisions: (1) it recognizes the defendant’s 
implied consent to certain third-party claims; (2) it defines, in precise terms, 
permitted third-party plaintiffs; (3) it guards against the possibility of third-
party joinder which may cause corporate double jeopardy; (4) it highlights addi-
tional considerations that a tribunal must weigh in instances where the proposed 
third-party plaintiff is a member of a vulnerable population.
The procedural aspects that follow once third-party joinder is permitted (for 
example, the right of the third-party to choose arbitrators themselves,118 or spe-
cial procedures tribunals may adopt to process large numbers of parties and 
claims119) are left unaddressed within this proposal. The original guidance pro-
vided by the Hague Rules on such matters should be assumed to govern if not 
mentioned otherwise. In line with the principles underlying the Hague Rules, 
this proposal assumes that parties have the requisite resources to cover the basic 
costs of arbitration and their own representation (including through options such 
as legal aid system or contingency funding).120
1.  Consent and Permitted Third-Party Plaintiffs
a. Subject Matter Consent
Party consent to two aspects of arbitration is necessary: subject matter and 
permitted third-party plaintiffs. The first question of consent pertains to the 
subject matter at issue. Although exceptions are occasionally made,121 the tradi-
tional governing principle states that arbitrators may only decide upon matters 
included within the scope of parties’ agreements.122 The new framework on 
third-party joinder should retain this strict interpretation of consent to preserve 
corporate buy-in to arbitration. As highlighted by stakeholder commentary dur-
ing the drafting of the Hague Rules, holding corporations accountable without 
an explicit breach of contract is one of the most pressing obstacles to addressing 
human rights violations.123 Should arbitral tribunals be persuaded to look out-
117. Cf. The Hague Rules, supra note 50, art. 19.
118. See, e.g., João Duarte de Sousa, Joinder of Third Parties in International Arbitration,
GARRIGUES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.garrigues.com/en_GB/new/joinder-third-parties-
international-arbitration.
119. See The Hague Rules, supra note 50, art. 19 cmt. 2. 
120. See id. at 4.
121. See, e.g., Bernard Hanotiau, Consent to Arbitration: Do we Share a Common Vision?, 27 
ARB. INT’L 539, 552–53 (2011) (summarizing the theory of “consent by conduct” in international 
arbitration). 
122. See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2 (3d ed. 2017).
123. See Letter from Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. to Drafting Team of the Hague Rules 
on Bus. and Hum. Rts. Arb. 13 (Jan. 31, 2019) (on file with the Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment).
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side the contractual terms of party agreements for human rights violations, cor-
porations might eschew the arbitral process altogether. Moreover, keeping 
within the four corners of the contract with respect to subject matter consent 
does not prohibitively limit actions based on human rights violations. A so-
called “new generation” of international investment agreements now takes a 
positive approach to holding investors accountable for violations of human 
rights.124 These agreements include clauses detailing environmental, labor, and 
human rights standards that must be met over the course of the contract.125
Outside of the investment agreement context, business enterprises have also be-
gun to introduce human rights provisions into their private commercial con-
tracts since the introduction of the UNGPs in 2011.126 The Hague Rules should 
encourage tribunals to read corporations’ contractual commitments to human 
rights broadly and in light of the UNGPs.
A possible criticism to this proposed conception of party consent is that it 
impermissibly limits the universe of human rights claims to those that the cor-
poration itself consents to. Critics might also contend that this strict interpreta-
tion of subject matter consent does not go far enough so as to bring legitimacy 
to the project of business human rights arbitration as whole.
Countering both of these points, however, is the underlying balancing prin-
ciple. Consent may be expanded past the narrow conception envisioned by the 
Drafters, but not dispensed with entirely. To do otherwise would threaten the 
viability of business human rights arbitration altogether. Corporate buy-in for 
the practice would almost certainly deteriorate with the perception of exposure 
to “open-ended liability.”127 The current approach strikes a balance by reading 
corporations’ contractual commitments to human rights objectives broadly 
while at the same time preserving the core of corporate defendants’ right to con-
sent to the subject matter of the arbitration.
b. A Contraction to the Doctrine of Privity of Contract
The second question of consent concerns the parties who may bring a claim 
based upon the arbitration agreement. Here, my proposed framework departs 
from the principles set forth by the Hague Rules. Individuals that have been 
124. Crina Blatag, Human Rights and Environmental Disputes in International Arbitration,
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (July 24, 2018), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/07/24
/human-rights-and-environmental-disputes-in-international-arbitration/.
125. Nour Nicolas, Recent Clauses Pertaining to Environmental, Labor and Human Rights in 




126. Antony Crockett, Human Rights Clauses in Commercial Contracts, LONDON SCH.
ECON: INV. & HUM. RTS. PROJECT (June 4, 2014), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/investment-and-human-
rights/portfolio-items/6667/.
127. See Glimcher, supra note 90, at 259 (quoting PAUL M. BARRETT ET AL., FIVE YEARS 
AFTER RANA PLAZA: THE WAY FORWARD 11 (2018)).
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harmed by a breach of the corporation’s human rights obligations under the 
terms of the underlying commercial contract should be permitted to join the ar-
bitration to bring such a claim. In determining a claimant’s eligibility for third-
party joinder, the tribunal would apply a simple tort-based analysis: the third-
party plaintiff’s claim would be required to allege that the company breached a 
duty owed to the plaintiff and that this breach was the direct or proximate cause 
of the harm that the plaintiff suffered.128 Most of the tribunal’s analysis of this 
claim will take place during the merits portion of the arbitral proceeding. For 
purposes of determining third-party joinder, however, two questions must be 
considered.
First, did the corporate defendant assume this duty? This will be deter-
mined by the terms of the corporate defendant’s contract upon which the ongo-
ing arbitration is based. The tribunal should analyze this first question without 
regard to the plaintiff’s identity. An example illustrates how this might be ap-
plied in practice. In the case of Lungowe v. Vedanta, 1800 individuals in Zam-
bia sought damages from a mining company that polluted waterways in Zambia 
and caused personal injury to community residents.129 To prevail on third-party 
joinder before an arbitral tribunal under the new framework, these plaintiffs 
would need to allege that the underlying investment contract at issue contained 
a clause binding the company to respect a duty pertaining to human rights and 
that the company breached that duty. The plaintiffs requesting third-party join-
der may prevail on this inquiry even if the duty was not explicitly owed to the 
third-party plaintiff requesting joinder. In other words, the plaintiffs in the 
Lungowe case would need to prove that the corporation committed itself to a 
duty to protect human rights; they need not prove that this duty was owed spe-
cifically to the communities surrounding the Zambian waterways.
The question of whether a duty is sufficiently connected to human rights 
should be decided in reference to those rights recognized under the UNGPs.130
On these facts, a third-party claim could be based upon a contractual duty 
grounded in the right to an adequate standard of living or the right to health. A
clause within the agreement that gives rise to third-party joinder in this case 
might read: “The Contracting Party must take every measure necessary to pro-
128. Cf. Negligence, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex
/negligence (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
129. Ruth Cowley & Stuart Neely, Lungowe v Vedanta Appeal Highlights Important Points 
Regarding Parent Company Liability, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-gb/knowledge/publications/bf5c2c71/emlungowe-v-
vedantaem-appeal-highlights-important-points-regarding-parent-company-liability.
130. See generally The Relationship Between Businesses and Human Rights, UN GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK (July 2015), https://www.ungpreporting.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/07/UNGPRF_businesshumanrightsimpacts.pdf (outlining certain human rights, brief 
explanations of those rights, and examples of how businesses might be involved with an impact on 
that right).
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tect human life and health within the scope of its activities undertaken pursuant 
to this Agreement.”131
This adaptation to the Hague Rules on third-party joinder will enable vic-
tims of human rights abuses to vindicate their right to an effective remedy to 
which they are entitled under the UNGPs.132 At the same time, the adaptation 
preserves corporations’ right to consent to the subject matter of arbitration.
Although this may give rise to the possibility of actions the corporation did not 
foresee at the outset, this concern is tempered by the second stage of the consent 
inquiry.
The second relevant question to determine the eligibility of third-party join-
der concerns the identity of the plaintiff herself. Is the plaintiff bringing the 
claim an individual who is directly or proximately harmed by the defendant’s 
alleged breach? In other words, those directly harmed by the defendant’s 
breach should be permitted to join the arbitration; family members and other 
close relatives of those harmed may have a colorable claim based on proximate 
cause; and NGOs may not bring claims on behalf of individuals under this 
framework.133
Civil society actors may contend that limiting third-party joinder to those 
directly and proximately injured by corporations’ human rights violations does 
not go far enough. Critics holding this view may prefer an arrangement akin to 
the Bangladesh Accords, which went so far as to permit NGOs, labor unions, 
and injured parties themselves to bring actions against multinational corpora-
tions for violations of their duties under the Accords.134 However, a similarly 
expansive theory of joinder cannot be as easily transposed onto the Hague 
Rules. The Bangladesh Accords are unique in that the MNCs explicitly signed 
a legally binding agreement with NGOs and labor unions consenting to arbitra-
tion on specific terms.135 In contrast, the Hague Rules and third-party joinder 
are concerned with the rights of individuals who were not party to the underly-
ing agreement. The proposed framework within this Section is permissible un-
der international law: to allow those directly and proximately injured by a cor-
poration’s human rights violations is a right supported by the UNGPs 
themselves;136 at minimum, is contemplated by international tribunals;137 and in 
131. See generally Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in Internation-
al Investment Agreements (Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev., Working Paper on International Invest-
ment 2011/01, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2011_1.pdf (providing 
template language for binding human rights obligations contained in agreements such as Bilateral 
Investment Treaties). 
132. UN Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 22 (Principle 25).
133. Cf. Bangladesh Accord, supra note 80, ¶¶ 1–5.
134. See Glimcher, supra note 90, at 259, 261.
135. See id.
136. See UN Guiding Principles, supra note 16, at 13 (Commentary to Principle 11) (Busi-
nesses’ responsibility to respect human rights is a “global standard of expected conduct for all busi-
ness enterprises wherever they operate” and addressing any adverse human rights impact requires 
mitigation and, where appropriate, remediation).
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egregious instances, is permitted by international human rights law.138 No such 
right is granted under international law to parties unconnected to the harm itself.
2.  Refusal of Joinder Claims Causing Corporate Double Jeopardy
In addition to an expansion on the concept of party consent and permitted 
third-party plaintiffs, the revised Hague Rules on third-party joinder should 
guard against the possibility of duplicative actions against corporate defendants.
The tribunal should not accept a third-party claim that would violate the com-
mon law concept of double jeopardy (or its civil law counterpart ne bis in idem).
This is a necessary addition to the Hague Rules as no existing international 
framework currently prevents instances of corporate double jeopardy.139 Two 
inquiries should be made in determining the admission of a third-party claim.
First, has the same human rights claim arising from the same operative facts 
previously been heard by an arbitral tribunal?140 If so, the current tribunal 
should abide by the principles of the New York Convention and view the prior 
decision as having a res judicata effect.141 The plaintiff should be denied third-
party joinder in this instance. If the third-party plaintiff has raised the same 
claim before a national court and received a judgment, the Hague Rules should 
contain a strong presumption that the court’s judgment is res judicata. In order 
for the tribunal to consider the plaintiff’s request for third-party joinder in the 
case at hand, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that the national 
court’s judgment should be set aside and that they should be given the oppor-
tunity to relitigate. The analysis for vacating a prior court’s judgment may be 
conducted according to the individual rules of the respective tribunals.
Considerations surrounding double jeopardy are crucial to consider for both 
the corporate defendant and the third-party plaintiff. On one hand, arbitral tri-
bunals should not become a place for plaintiffs to relitigate claims against 
which a corporation has successfully defended itself against. On the other hand, 
arbitral tribunals are often the only neutral, viable judicial forum where plain-
tiffs alleging human rights abuses have a chance of success. As Hague Rules 
Drafter Diane Desierto has observed, “the path for international justice for in-
137. See, e.g., Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Perú, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, 
Award, ¶ 1195 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
138. See G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005). 
139. Andrew T. Bulovsky, Promoting Predictability in Business: Solutions for Overlapping 
Liability in International Anti-Corruption Enforcement, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L. 549, 551 (2019).
140. See generally Mark Jay Altschuler, The Res Judicata Implications of Pendent Jurisdic-
tion, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1981).
141. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE ON THE 
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, art. III 
cmt. 12 (2016), https://newyorkconvention1958.org/pdf/guide/2016_Guide_on_the_NY_
Convention.pdf (“Although article III does not expressly provide that arbitral awards have res judi-
cata effect, a number of national courts have ruled that it has such a consequence in practice.”). 
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ternational human rights claimants against transnational corporate activities is 
laden with jurisdictional hurdles, evidentiary burdens, resource disparities, po-
litical asymmetries, sociological and situational differences.”142 The suggested 
policy strikes a balance between upholding corporations’ international legal 
rights while taking into account the unique difficulties faced by victims of cor-
porate human rights abuses.
3.  Additional Considerations When Weighing Third-Party Joinder Claims from 
Vulnerable Populations Under International Law
The final addition to the new framework on third-party joinder under the 
Hague Rules concerns the identity of the third-party plaintiff themselves. The 
Hague Rules should advise arbitral tribunals to take into account the rights that 
such individuals have under international law when reviewing a third-party 
joinder request. The tribunals should not look to whether such parties have a 
claim against the corporate defendant under international law. Rather, the du-
ties owed to such vulnerable populations under international law should be used 
as a thumb on the scale in favor of permitting the aggrieved plaintiff access to 
third-party joinder in otherwise ambiguous situations.
An example illustrates how this might be applied in practice. In the case of 
Aguas del Tunari v. Republic of Bolivia, Bolivia awarded a forty-year agree-
ment to a Bolivian company for the exclusive right to provide water in the city 
of Cochabamba.143 The contract drew criticism from the local community, and 
protests that were initially peaceful became violent.144 Bolivia attempted to pri-
vatize the water service and annul the recession agreement; the spurned compa-
ny submitted a claim for violation of the Bilateral Investment Treaty.145 Let us 
imagine there is a third-party indigenous claimant who suffered human rights 
abuses during the protests and wishes to hold the private company accountable 
under commitments it made to the protection of local populations in the con-
tract. She submits her claim for joinder, but the tribunal is on the fence as to 
whether to permit her claim in light of the foregoing consent analysis. Here, the 
tribunal should be permitted to consider her status as part of a vulnerable group 
and consider the private company’s contractual commitments through this lens.
In recent years, international bodies have endorsed the principle of free, prior 
and informed consent (“FPIC”) in situations where companies use land occu-
pied by indigenous persons.146 The arbitral tribunal should be permitted to refer 
142. Desierto, supra note 39.
143. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia. ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/3. Jurisdiction. 20 ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 450 (2005), 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 179, 179 (2007).
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Kathryn Tomlinson, Indigenous Rights and Extractive Resource Projects: Negotiations 
Over the Policy and Implementation of FPIC, 23 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 880, 881 (2019).
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to this international principle when considering whether the claimant has a col-
orable claim under the terms of the underlying commercial contract.
In such situations, the arbitral tribunal would not be permitted to take into 
account the discrete characteristics of the individual claimant in determining 
whether they conform to the category of a vulnerable population. Rather, these 
determinations should be made by reference to the groups recognized under in-
ternational law while considering the facts in the underlying dispute. To con-
tinue with the above example, one’s rights under international conventions as a 
person with a disability would be less relevant in the facts of the Aguas del Tu-
nari case than one’s status an indigenous person.147 This guidance will prevent 
otherwise immaterial considerations of one’s identity from impermissibly skew-
ing corporate defendant’s obligations under the underlying commercial contract.
CONCLUSION
The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights have provoked an interna-
tional conversation on the viability of business human rights arbitration. They 
should be viewed as an opportunity to create a forum whereby the rights of cor-
porate defendants might be reconciled with the abilities of victims of human 
rights abuses to bring their claims. But the Hague Rules are a first draft. We 
should critique the rules and build upon their ingenuity with better, more con-
sidered principles as we learn from time and experience. Third-party joinder is 
one realm that the Hague Rules has left open for improvement. In modifying 
and building upon the current structure, the third-party joinder mechanism has 
the capacity to both legitimize and advance business human rights arbitration as 
a whole.
147. In this case, one’s status as an indigenous person is more relevant to the facts of the 
Aguas del Tunari case because of the FPIC principle which has no parallel application to persons 
with disabilities.

